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ABSTRACT 
This article proposes a communication perspective on the problem of knowledge transfer 
between experts and managers in organizational decision making processes. We outline why this 
perspective is important and we show where and when knowledge communication matters. After 
an overview of typical knowledge communication situations in management, we define 
knowledge communication and differentiate it from other types of professional communication. 
We do so by showing that what is communicated differs from regular communication contexts, 
as well as how one communicates. We then review 26 existing theoretical concepts that describe 
barriers to knowledge communication. We relate these constructs to results obtained from 7 
focus groups with engineers and IT experts and 30 interviews with managers and consultants. 
Based on our findings, we categorize typical knowledge communication problems between 
experts and managers into five groups: expert-caused, manager-caused, reciprocal mistakes, 
situation-caused, and organizational barriers. As a synthesis, we propose a structural model of 
the drivers of knowledge communication quality. The article closes with implications for 
management and outlines open issues and future research questions. 
  
 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE COMMUNICATION IN 
MANAGEMENT 
Communicating professional knowledge is a key activity for today’s specialized workforce. The 
efficient and effective transfer of experiences, insights, and know-how among different experts 
and decision makers is a prerequisite for high-quality decision making and co-ordinated, 
organizational action [Straub & Karahanna, 1998]. Situations of such deliberate (interfunctional) 
knowledge transfer through interpersonal communication or group conversations [Gratton & 
Goshal, 2002] can be found in many business constellations, as the following typical examples 
illustrate: Technology experts present their evaluation of a new technology to management in 
order to jointly devise a new production strategy [McDermott, 1999]. Engineers who have 
discovered how to master a difficult manufacturing process need to convey their methods to 
engineers and managers in other business units [Szulanski, 1996, 1999]. Legal experts brief a 
management team on the implications of new regulations on their business model [Wilmotte & 
Morgan, 1984]. Project leaders need to present their results to the upper management and share 
their experiences of past projects in order to assess the potential of new project candidates 
[Schindler & Eppler, 2003]. Scientists who work as drug developers present new avenues for 
future products that business unit managers must assess. Market researchers present their 
statistical analyses of recent consumer surveys to the head of marketing [Boland et al., 2001]. 
Strategy consultants present the findings of their strategic company assessment to the board of 
directors in order to improve strategic planning [Creplet et al., 2001].  These are just a few 
examples that illustrate the importance of knowledge communication in management. The list is 
extended in table 1. It outlines typical management domains in which the sharing of specialist 
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knowledge is critical to decision making. Table 1 not only compiles decision makers and their 
needs and questions, but it also lists corresponding experts and their decision-relevant 
knowledge.  
Table 1: Examples of knowledge communication in management 
MANAGEMENT 
DOMAIN  
DECISION MAKER & 
KNOWLEDGE NEEDS 
SPECIALISTS & TASKS TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE      
that is transferred 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY  (IT) 
CIO (chief information officer): 
which system should we buy? 
IT Analysts:  
Evaluate software & suppliers, 
recommend purchase 
Technology & market know-how, 
evaluation and analysis results 
FINANCE CFO (chief financial officer): 
where should we invest our cash 
base? 
Financial Analysts:  
evaluate investment opportunities, 
recommend shares, bonds, etc. 
Financial know-how, forecasts,  
company analyses, know-who 
(knowledge about people) 
PURCHASING Head of Purchasing: 
which supplier is best for us? 
Purchasing Analysts: 
evaluate potential suppliers, 
recommend supplier base 
Market knowledge, experience 
with suppliers, knowledge about 
contractual terms 
PLANNING CEO (chief executive officer): 
what is going to happen in the 
market and how should we internally 
react to it? 
Strategic Planners: analyze possible 
developments and scenarios and their 
impact on the company. Present 
ramifications. 
Know-what-if: possible future 
states and feasible responses, 
scenario-building know-how 
M & A CEO : 
Which companies are potential 
acquisition candidates? 
Business Analysts: Screen potential 
candidates, calculate company value; 
perform due diligence 
Valuation results, market 
knowledge, analysis results 
R & D Head of R&D (research and 
development): 
Which technologies must we 
incorporate, which projects must we 
prioritize? 
Product Development Engineer: 
technology monitoring, testing & 
evaluation, recommendation on new 
projects 
Technology know-how, 
knowledge about pros and cons of 
certain technologies, risks and 
benefits  associated with certain 
technologies 
MARKETING Product Manager: 
How is my product perceived by the 
market? 
Market Research Analysts: identify 
consumer preferences and 
communicate consequences 
Customer knowledge, 
methodological know-how, 
market insights 
PRODUCTION Head of Production :  
How can we assure consistent 
quality in our production? 
assembly line engineers: Identify 
quality problem root causes and 
countermeasures 
Production experience, problem 
analyses, quality management 
know-how 
LEGAL / REGULATORY 
AFFAIRS / 
COMPLIANCE 
CEO / Entrepreneur: 
How do I comply with legal 
requirements? What are my 
rights/obligations/options? 
Lawyers: clarify application of law to 
a case, recommend argumentation and 
implementation internally 
Legal knowledge, compliance 
knowledge 
HUMAN RESOURCES Head of HR:  
what is the potential of this 
employee? 
Recruiting Specialists / Psychologists: 
evaluate candidates with tests & 
interviews  
Knowledge about people and 
their abilities and personalities 
RISK MANAGEMENT Risk Manager:  
How do I quantify these risks? 
Underwriters/ Actuaries: analyzes and 
calculates risk scenarios and risk 
probabilities and resulting margins 
Modeling know-how, industry 
knowledge, risk policy know-how
LEADERSHIP New team leader: How should I lead 
my team? 
Training Professional: convey 
leadership skills and insights 
Leadership know-how, 
experiences, methods, etc. 
STRATEGY CEO: 
She needs to know whether to use 
existing technology for a new market 
or remain with current approaches. 
Technology Consultants: conducts 
feasibility study and recommends 
strategy 
Industry knowledge, market 
knowledge, competitor 
knowledge 
SALES Head of Sales:  
He wants to know more about his 
staff of sales professionals: who are 
they, what makes them tick, how 
should they be managed? 
HR specialists: conveys her know-
who to the sales manager: what 
background do his sales 
representatives have, what motivates 
them, how do they work, whom do 
they know etc. 
Knowledge about people, 
experience with staff. 
 
What these diverse situations all have in common is the problem of knowledge asymmetry 
[Sharma, 1997] that has to be resolved through interpersonal communication. While the manager 
typically has the authority to make strategic or tactical decisions, he or she often lacks the 
specialized expertise required to make an informed decision on a complex issue (Watson, 2004). 
This authority-expertise chasm calls for knowledge communication. Because of the wide scope 
of decisions that need to be made, a manager frequently has to delegate the decision preparation 
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to experts who – based on their professional training and previous experience –  can analyze 
complex situations or technological options in a more reliable manner. The results of such 
analyses then need to be communicated back to the manager, often under considerable time 
constraints. The knowledge communication challenge, however, begins long before that, at the 
time when the manager has to convey his or her knowledge needs and decision constraints to the 
experts in order to delegate the analysis task effectively. These and other problems will be 
discussed in the subsequent sections. Before, however, we briefly define the notion of knowledge 
communication more explicitly and distinguish it from other forms of communication. 
 
 
2. THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE COMMUNICATION 
Based on the reasoning described in the previous section, we define knowledge communication 
as the (deliberate) activity of interactively conveying and co-constructing insights, assessments, 
experiences, or skills through verbal and non-verbal means. Knowledge communication has 
taken place when an insight, experience or skill has been successfully reconstructed by an 
individual because of the communicative actions of another. Knowledge communication thus 
designates the successful transfer of know-how (e.g., how to accomplish a task), know-why (e.g., 
the cause-effect relationships of a complex phenomenon), know-what (e.g., the results of a test), 
and know-who (e.g., the experiences with others) through face-to-face (co-located) or media-
based (virtual) interactions. This type of knowledge communication can take place 
synchronously or asynchronously1. The first mode of communication refers to (often face to 
face) real-time interactions, while the latter designates delayed (usually media-based) 
interactions. We use the term knowledge dialogues for the first type of (synchronous) knowledge 
communication, stressing the interactive and collaborative style of knowledge exchange in this 
communication mode (see Isaacs, 1997). For the later type of (asynchronous) knowledge 
communication, we refer to the concept of knowledge media (see Eppler et al., 1999), 
Knowledge media enable knowledge transfer through technology based communication, 
collaboration, e-learning, retrieval and archiving services. 
 
In this understanding, knowledge communication is more than communicating information (e.g., 
facts, figures, events, situations, developments, etc.) or emotions (e.g., fears, hopes, reservations, 
commitment) because it requires conveying context, background, and basic assumptions. It 
requires the communication of personal insights and experiences. Communicating insights 
requires the elicitation of one’s rationale and reasoning (i.e., one’s argumentation structure), of 
one’s perspective, values, ratings and priorities, and of one’s hunches and intuition. At times it 
may even be necessary to present an overview of the expert’s relevant skills, previous 
                                                 
1  Both modes can be used in one-to-one or one-to-many contexts. Both modes can rely on speech, text, graphics, 
and other means of communication (i.e., verbal and non-verbal).  
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professional experiences and credentials (Lunce et al., 1993) in order to build trust and enable an 
adequate atmosphere for effective knowledge transfer. Thus, in addition to pure information (and 
at times emotion), a myriad of other (contextual) indicators need to be provided in order to 
transfer knowledge. These indicators help the person who requires insights from another to 
understand the other’s perspective, to re-construct the other’s insights correctly, and to connect 
them to one’s own prior knowledge.  
 
Still, knowledge communication does not  only differ in terms of what is communicated 
(knowledge in context rather than isolated data or information2), but also how one 
communicates. The transfer of information can often be successful without additional effort 
beyond an ordinary, every day communication style. Communicating expertise-based, complex 
insights, by contrast, calls for didactic tricks and at times sophisticated indirect speech acts and 
visualization means that help the other side to become actively involved in the communication 
and engage in a collaborative, goal-directed sense making process – a prerequisite for the 
construction of new knowledge (see Weick, 1995). The process of knowledge communication 
hence requires more reciprocal interaction between decision makers and experts because both 
sides only have a fragmented understanding of an issue and consequently can only gain a 
complete comprehension by iteratively aligning their mental models. All of this means that when 
we communicate knowledge, we are still communicating information and emotions, but we also 
create a specific type of context so that this information can be used to re-construct insights, 
create new perspectives, or acquire new skills. 
 
This (interpersonal) communication perspective on knowledge transfer has already been 
emphasized by other researchers – who also explicitly label this view as ‘knowledge 
communication’3 – (Scarbrough, 1995, p. 997; Antonelli, 2000; Harada, 2003; Reiserer et al., 
2002) and by several practitioners (e.g., Mitchell, 2001; Watson, 2004). Nevertheless, these 
authors have often treated knowledge communication as a kind of black box that is described 
only in broad terms and general traits, such as the major communication goals or steps. By 
examining the communication problems which often impede knowledge transfer in detail, we 
can look into this black box and propose ways of improving knowledge communication, 
especially among experts and managers.   
                                                 
2  Our distinction between data, information, and knowledge follows the main stream conception found in current 
literature (see for example Davenport & Prusak, 1998). We view data as isolated recordings that are often 
generated automatically and cannot be directly used to answer questions. Information is connected, condensed 
or generally processed data that allows an individual to answer questions. Knowledge is what enables an 
individual to ask relevant questions (Newman and Newman, 1985, p. 499). It refers to the capability of an 
individual to solve problems (Probst et al., 1999). Information only becomes knowledge, if a person interprets 
that information correctly, connects that piece of information with his or her prior knowledge, and can apply it 
to problems or decisions (see also Alavi & Leidner, 2001) 
3  Many researchers, however, neglect the issue of communication to a great extent. In a review of knowledge 
management literature by Scarbrough and Swan (2001) communication does not surface as a core issue in the 
knowledge management literature from 1993 to 1998. 
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3. PROBLEMS IN THE COMMUNICATION OF KNOWLEDGE AMONG EXPERTS 
AND MANAGERS 
 
In order to better understand the problems that can impede the effective transfer of decision-
relevant knowledge from experts to managers and from managers to experts, we will review 
relevant constructs and prior findings from various applied social sciences, as there are in fact 
numerous concepts that describe issues related to sub-optimal knowledge transfer. These 
concepts regard topics such as interdepartmental knowledge transfer, professional 
communication, decision making, communication technology, or the nature of expert knowledge. 
By screening these disciplines and topic areas, we can establish a first overview of possible 
knowledge communication problems and we can create a systematic terminology to speak more 
explicitly (and consistently) about knowledge communication barriers.  
 
3.1 Existing constructs that explain knowledge communication problems 
 
Potential barriers to knowledge transfer between experts and managers that have already been 
identified and studied are summarized in table 2. There are three main criteria for including 
concepts in this table: first, the concept has to be closely related to problems of interpersonal, 
professional knowledge transfer4; second the concept has to describe a problem of major impact 
on the quality of knowledge communication (rare or very specific issues are not included); third, 
the concept has to be influential (e.g., it should have triggered a significant response in the 
literature). The resulting list in table 2 first includes ‘umbrella’ concepts that designate a group of 
closely related problems, such as cognitive biases, decision making problems, argumentation 
fallacies, communication biases, or defensive routines, and then concepts that label individual 
problems, such as the not-invented here syndrome or the ASK problem. 
   
                                                 
4  The concept does not have to originate in the context of interpersonal communication research, but its 
application to it must be obvious and fruitful, as in the example of the ASK problem. The ASK problem was 
first discussed in the information retrieval community, but it has ramifications for interpersonal knowledge 
communication as well. 
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Table 2 : Key research concepts that illustrate social and cognitive knowledge communication 
barriers 
Key Concept / Knowledge 
Communication  Barrier 
Description References 
Cognitive biases (confirmation, 
availability, recency, dichotomized 
reasoning, sunk costs/escalating 
commitment, framing, anchoring, 
representativeness, etc.) 
Knowledge may not be correctly interpreted, accepted or 
used due to biases in one’s reasoning, such as listening 
only to those insights that confirm one’s prior opinion. 
Tversky & Kahnemann, 
1974 
Decision problems such as plunging 
In, Shooting from the hip, poor 
feedback, taking shortcuts, frame 
blindness etc. 
The decision maker may for example believe that he can 
make a complex decision right away without looking 
further at the provided analysis. 
Russo & Shoemaker, 1989 
Communication biases  
(audience tuning, misattribution bias, 
saying-is-believing, shared reality) 
The knowledge is inadvertently manipulated through 
communication itself: 
- Audience Tuning: Communicators spontaneously tune 
their messages to:  
–the personal characteristics of the audience 
–the situational factors  
–Misattribution Bias: Communicators tend to consider 
their audience-tuned messages to be about the topic of the 
message rather than about the audience 
- Saying-Is-Believing Effect: Autopersuasion has stronger 
effects because one does not activate regular mechanisms 
of critical reflection. 
- Shared Reality: You consider your audience-tuned 
message to provide objective, accurate information on the 
message topic because it was shared with others. 
Higgins, 1999 
Argumentation fallacies (begging 
the question, over-generalizing, 
personal attacks, defective testimony, 
problematic premise, slippery slope, 
red herring, etc.) 
In demonstrating one’s ideas and insights, people fall into 
argumentative traps, such as begging the question (circular 
reasoning), over-generalizing, appealing to false majorities 
or false expertise, reasoning ad consequentiam (what 
shouldn’t be true, can’t be true) or reacting with direct 
attacks at a person  (at hominem) rather than at a 
knowledge claim. 
Van Eemeren, 1992 
Defensive routines (skilled 
incompetence, learned helplessness, 
easing-in, etc.) 
New knowledge is sometimes not accepted (or provided) 
due to mechanisms or habits that prevent the identification 
and acceptance of one’s own ignorance. This may lead to a 
reduced effort to understand complex issues (learned 
helplessness) . 
Argyris, 1986, 1990   
Knowledge disavowal 
 
  
A number of factors have been found which limit 
information use in organizations, such as not spending 
enough time collecting advice, refusal to share, fear of 
exposure, etc. Knowledge disavowal occurs when reliable 
and relevant information is not shared among decision 
makers. 
Zaltman, 1983; Deshpande 
and Kohli, 1989 
Knowledge sharing hostility Knowledge communication fails because the ‘knowledge 
giver’s are reluctant to share their insights due to 
micropolitics, strenuous relationships, or due to fear. 
Husted & Michailova, 2002 
Micropolitics of knowledge The ‘knowledge claims’ of an expert are discredited by the 
decision makers due to their differing (hidden) agenda, 
because of a coalition of people with an alternative view, 
or due to the expert’s lack of formal authority. 
Lazega, 1992 
Internal knowledge stickiness Knowledge can sometimes not be transferred because of 
arduous relationships, or casual ambiguities regarding the 
knowledge or because of the lack of absorptive capacity of 
the knowledge receivers. 
Szulanski, 1996, 1999 
Groupthink A (management) team may not truly listen to the input of 
an expert because of the team’s group coherence and 
group dynamics sometimes block outside advice and feel 
Janis, 1982 
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omniscient. 
Information overload An individual is sometimes not able to integrate new 
information into the decision making process because too 
much complex information has to be interpreted too 
quickly. 
O’Reilly, 1980, Eppler & 
Mengis, 2004 
Self/Other effect Individuals tend to discount advice and favor their own 
opinion. 
Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000 
Knowing-Doing gap / Smart talk 
trap 
Sometimes organization know where a problem resides 
and how to tackle it, but do not move from knowledge to 
action (due to unhealthy internal competition or lacking 
follow-up). 
Pfeffer & Sutton, 2000 
Absorptive capacity Limited ability of decision makers to grasp the knowledge 
of the expert based on a lack of prior knowledge. 
Bower and Hilgard, 1981; 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990 
Paradox of expertise Experts sometimes find it difficult to articulate their 
knowledge or rephrase their insights in a way that a non-
experts can understand. Sometimes experts indicate other 
rules than they actually apply. 
Johnson, 1983 
Ingroup outgroup behavior We tend to interact more with likewise groups than with 
others thus reducing our changes to acquire radically new 
knowledge. 
Blau, 1977 
Task closure In our communication ,we may choose to use a one way 
communication medium because it permits us to close an 
open task without having to have a conversation. Thus 
leaner communication channels are used than may be 
necessary. In other words: We tend to want to close a 
communication process in order to complete an open task. 
Straub & Karahanna, 1998; 
Meyer, 1962 
Set-up to fail syndrome Managers are projecting their initial expectation of an 
expert’s likely performance unto him/her, leading to the 
self-fulfilling prophecy of (at times) lower performance. 
This is aggravated by de-motivating feedback to the 
expert. 
Manzoni and Barsoux, 2002 
ASK problem Anomalous State of Knowledge: when a decision maker 
does not have the knowledge base to really know what to 
ask for. People need to know quite a bit about a topic to be 
able to ask or search for relevant information. 
Belkin, 1980 ; Chen et al., 
1992 
 
Not-Invented here syndrome Knowledge from others is sometimes rejected because it 
originated elsewhere. 
Katz & Allen,  1982 
False consensus effect We assume others see situations as we do, and fail to 
revise our framing. 
Manzoni & Barsoux, 2002 
Inert knowledge The knowledge that the decision maker has acquired from 
the expert does not come to mind when it is needed or 
useful for decision making or actions. The transferred 
knowledge is stuck in the situation where it has been 
acquired. 
Whitehead, 1929 
Hidden profile problem You don’t know the other’s background, e.g. what they 
know and could contribute. The only knowledge that is 
consequently shared is what is expected by everyone. 
Stasser 1992; Stasser and 
Stewart, 1992 
Common knowledge effect The tendency of a group to focus merely on commonly 
shared (rather than unique) pieces of information. 
Gigone & Hastie, 1993 
Lack of common ground Common ground refers to the manager’s and expert’s 
assumptions about their shared background beliefs about 
the world. If those assumptions are wrong or inconsistent 
communication becomes more difficult. 
Clark and Schäfer, 1989, 
Olson & Olson, 2000 
Cassandra syndrome The decision makers do not give sufficient weight or 
attention to an expert’s warning because they face many 
other important problems. Only when the situation has 
deteriorated dramatically do they start taking the expert’s 
advice. 
Mikalachki, 1983 
 
The problems listed in table 2 are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive.  
Nevertheless, table one summarizes many of the key pitfalls in communicating knowledge. It is 
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in the nature of the phenomenon that these problems are not isolated, but that they interact in 
many, sometimes unpredictable ways. 
 
3.2 Knowledge communication problem categories in overview 
 
Based on the concepts from table 2, and based on 7 focus groups5 and 10 personal interviews 
with engineers that frequently collaborate with managers in their companies, as well as 
interviews with 20 IT managers6 who regularly interact with experts for their decision making, 
we distinguish among five types of knowledge communication problems. They are briefly 
summarized below before we give further examples of each type of problem, as they were told to 
us by experts and managers. 
 
A first type of knowledge communication problems are expert-caused difficulties. These 
mistakes make it cumbersome for the decision maker to grasp the insights of a specialist. This 
type of problem also includes issues that make it difficult for the manager to explain his or her 
own constraints and priorities to experts. Examples of this kind of problem are the use of overly 
technical jargon, not relating the insights to the manager’s situation, starting with details before 
an overview is given or a lacking interest of the expert in related (but relevant) issues. From the 
list provided in table 2 knowledge-sharing hostility and the paradox of expertise would clearly 
belong to this category. 
 
A second category of knowledge communication challenges are manager-caused problems that 
leave it unclear to the expert what the manager actually expects from him/her, or that make it 
difficult for the expert to convey what he or she knows (because of inadequate attention). 
Examples of such manager-induced communication problems abound: A manager may be 
reluctant to discuss detail problems which have major effects on an issue; he or she may lack 
concentration and pay too little attention. A manager may lack a basic level of technical know-
how thus making knowledge transfer difficult. From the list in table 2, the decision problems, the 
ASK problem, the Cassandra syndrome or the inert knowledge problem are typical examples of 
this group. 
 
                                                 
5  Each focus group lasted for approximately one hour and consisted of 8-20 participants. The focus group were 
conducted in 2002 and 2003 in Switzerland with engineers and IT specialists from various companies. Focus 
group facilitation and documentation was provided by the research team. The topic of the focus group 
discussion was “communication problems among engineers and managers”. 
6  Each interview lasted between 30 minutes to two hours. Interviewees were mostly senior IT managers or chief 
information officers of medium-sized and large Swiss companies, as well as select line managers with 
considerable experience. The main topic of the interviews was “problems in the knowledge communication 
with specialists.” For additional information, we refer to the appendix at the end of the article. 
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A third type of knowledge communication problems is caused by the mutual behavior of experts 
and managers, including their experiences or attitudes, e.g., reciprocal negative stereotypes or a 
neglecting to check for a common understanding of an issue. Examples from the list of concepts 
that belong to this group are lacking feedback on both sides, the set-up to fail syndrome, 
groupthink, or ingroup outgroup behavior.  
 
Fourth, we see problems caused by the interaction situation itself, such as extreme time 
constraints, inadequate communication infrastructure, distractions, dysfunctional interventions 
from others, etc. The problem of information overload in table 2 can arise due to the time 
constraints in a communication situation. But also the hidden profile problem can be due to the 
communicative situation, where the background of the participants is not fully revealed or 
discussed at the beginning of a manager-expert interaction. 
 
As a fifth and final category of knowledge communication problems, we group issues that are 
caused indirectly by the overall organizational context of managers and experts, such as their 
organizational constraints, their differing tasks, priorities and interests. The ‘micropolitics of 
knowledge’ concept listed in table 2 would be an example of the (negative) impact of the 
organizational context on the transfer of knowledge. 
 
Having briefly outlined the five main drivers of communication problems that impede effective 
knowledge transfer between experts and managers, we now look at each problem group 
individually. The problems listed in each category are mainly based on the aforementioned focus 
groups and interviews. Whenever possible, they are related to the constructs or concepts 
compiled and explained in table 2. 
 
3.3 Expert-caused knowledge communication problems 
 
What frustrates me most in the collaboration with our experts is their disregard of context, of the 
big picture or of how others will use their results. 
Head of truck development of an international automobile 
company (with a management background) 
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The relationship between specialists or experts7 and managers is not always an easy one.  As 
various documented institutional case studies (from the NASA challenger  catastrophe [Vaughan 
1997] to the dotcom bubble) show, successful communication between engineers and managers, 
analysts and investors, or consultants and entrepreneurs are crucial in many ways. Seldom is it a 
collaboration that can be characterized as harmonious, routine and void of conflict. In fact, 
experts’ and managers’ interests, priorities, and communication styles often collide when the two 
groups interact. Managers are quick to point out the shortcomings of experts when it comes to 
communicating their findings adequately. Specialists, such as engineers, themselves agree that 
they do not always pay enough attention to the way that they present their results. Their focus is 
on the production of results and not on their communication. Consequently, the impact of their 
ideas and insights is sometimes not as big as it could be. In this section, we thus focus on 
knowledge communication problems caused by experts. These problems were mentioned by 
experts themselves (e.g., by engineers, IT specialists, analysts, etc.) as well as by managers (e.g., 
CIOs, heads of marketing, entrepreneurs, R&D and technology managers etc.) in our focus 
groups and interviews. Whenever possible, we relate the problems that were voiced by managers 
or experts to the theoretical concepts introduced in the previous section. Although we begin by 
describing the problems that result from specific expert traits and behavior patterns, these issues 
are not the sole reasons why knowledge communication fails, as the subsequent sections will 
show.8 
 
Experts can impede the effective transfer of decision-relevant knowledge to and from 
management in many ways and at many stages of the knowledge transfer (from the initial 
briefing by management to the implementation of an expert recommendation) . They can do so 
intentionally (as in the case of knowledge sharing hostility) or without even being aware of their 
obstruction (as in audience tuning, see table 2). Many of the problems mentioned in the focus 
groups and interviews that we conducted can be related to three specific traits of expert behavior: 
first, overloading the communication with details or not giving it an adequate structure to absorb 
the complexity of an issue; second, not adapting the communication to the needs and prior 
knowledge of managers or adapting it too much to the management (e.g., saying what 
management wants to hear); a third problem cluster relates to an inadequate communication style 
of the expert. 
 
                                                 
7  We use the terms experts and specialists interchangeably in this context and understand them broadly rather 
than in a narrow sense. In this understanding, experts are those who possess and utilize relevant expertise in 
problem solving (Lunce et al., 1993). According to cognitive psychologist Kellog, 1997, (who bases his 
findings on Simon, Anderson, and other eminent cognitive science colleagues) experts have engaged in a 
deliberate practice in their field of expertise for a number of years (usually more than ten) with consistent high 
quality results. 
8  The problem can therefore not be resolved, as some managers may think, by simply sending engineers, analysts, 
or other types of specialists to a communication training. 
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The first problem cluster has many variations. All of them are related to the (in)adequate 
reduction of complexity. If the problem is intentionally caused by the expert, he or she may not 
even try to make a complex issue accessible to management. An issue  may be deliberately 
presented as something impenetrable and overly complex, so that the manager is less likely to 
ask the expert probing or critical questions and just accepts his or her advice. The expert may 
deliberately use technical terms, jargon, acronyms or difficult examples to achieve this objective. 
Some experts, however, simply forget to structure their insights in an accessible manner. They 
unintentionally drown the managers in a myriad of details on various abstraction levels and 
without adequate prioritization. They do not provide overviews, background9, summaries, 
ramifications or consequences of their analysis. The managers consequently struggle to create a 
coherent structure themselves, in order to make sense of the presented complexity. This problem 
is often aggravated by the fact that the expert’s deficient structure or prioritization results in a 
sub-optimal allocation of knowledge sharing time (e.g., the expert runs out of time before the 
implications of his analysis can be discussed). 
  
The second problem cluster is related to the first one, but goes beyond the reduction of  
complexity for management. This problem group, which can also be intentional or unintentional, 
refers to the inadequate adaptation of an expert’s contribution to a managerial decision process. 
Adaptation in this sense refers to the expert’s ability to relate his or her findings to the context of 
managers, that is to say to their goals, options, restrictions, to their prior knowledge and 
experience, and to their functional background. This implies that the expert has to take into 
account the manager’s unique perspective, his or her prior projects, general priorities, and 
preconceived notions. Many times, however, the expert just focuses on the problem at hand and 
its drivers, and does not offer possible linkages to the manager’s background or even to possible 
solutions.  If experts do focus on a possible solution to a problem, they often only discuss the 
technical dimension of its feasibility and neglect other issues, such as timing, competition, and 
costs. This is due to the fact that experts approach an issue with a different mind-set than 
managers. While management’s priorities may relate to budgeting, time-to-market or competitive 
advantage, specialists tends to focus on quality, risks, innovation and technology. Another 
related error refers to the fact that experts sometimes presuppose that the managers have 
technical knowledge to a degree that exceeds their actual technical know-how. Adaptation can 
also be exaggerated (as outlined in the ‘audience tuning’ effect in table 2). Sometimes experts 
may adapt their findings to a degree that changes the essence of their insights. They may say 
what managers want to hear or they may simply adapt their analysis to management’s 
preferences, holding back their true beliefs for political or career reasons (this is over-adaptation 
                                                 
9  The opposite, too much background, can also bother managers, as the following quote by a marketing director 
of a financial information company shows: „These people [experts] start with Adam and Eve in paradise and 
work their lengthy way up to the current business situation. That is tiresome, especially when you’re used to a 
headline type of news. “      
 13
is also related to the groupthink effect listed in table 2). This can lead to another important 
problem, namely that the expert gives advice in an area where he or she is not really qualified; 
the reason being that the expert tries to accommodate the managers’ expectations. 
  
The third major problem area refers to an inadequate communication style of  an expert, be it in 
oral communication or in writing. Experts need to find the difficult balance between self-
confidence (without being patronizing) and honesty (without being insecure). If an expert 
communicates in a self-serving manner, managers may feel aggressed and they may start to 
challenge the expertise just because of the expert’s attitude. An insecure or overly self-critical 
communication style, in contrast, will hurt the expert’s credibility. Style also relates to how an 
expert reacts to questions or concerns from management (e.g., aggressively and nervous versus 
in a calm and thoughtful manner). Other style issues concern the format of presentations and 
reports, as they often lack elegance or simply solid design, because of time constraints or lacking 
training or attention.  
  
Summarizing these issues, we can conclude that experts struggle with three major issues when 
transferring their knowledge to managers: First, reducing or synthesizing their insights 
adequately, second, adapting these trimmed insights to the management context without 
distorting them, and third, presenting the compressed and adapted findings in a trust-building 
style and reacting adequately to management questions and feedback.  
 
These issues are of course not independent of the behavior of the managers. The discussed 
problems are also the result of the experts’ experiences with managers. The next section will 
consequently look at management’s role in the knowledge transfer and how managers sometimes 
aggravate the described problems. Sometimes, however, managers have no way of influencing 
the experts on whom they depend, as the following quote by a department head of a large health 
care organization illustrates. Obviously, this manager has to depend on government specialists 
that she cannot influence. Her main problems with these experts relate to two issues discussed in 
this section: style and structure: „The documents originated by government institutions are often 
just horrible in terms of the style and the overall structure. At least summaries or a focus on the 
main five points would help. But I cannot dictate anything to them and they also work under time 
pressure, so what can I do?“  In section four, we will address this question of what to do as a 
manager to alleviate knowledge communication. In discussing this question, we will apparently 
have to distinguish between internal and external experts. First, however, we will look at further 
problems that can impede knowledge transfer.  
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3.4 Manager-caused knowledge communication problems 
 
I think it’s actually worse if a manager has a technical, but outdated, background. Not only do I 
have to inform him, but also re-educate him on the changes that have taken place since he left 
his engineering job. 
    Production engineer at a large industrial group 
 
 
In this section, we list the problems that can affect knowledge transfer in the decision process 
negatively as far as they are caused directly or indirectly by managers or decision makers. We 
categorize the problems that we gathered during focus groups with engineers and managers, and 
during personal interviews in IT departments, consulting companies, and two market research 
firms, into four group: problems caused by the inadequate expert briefing by the manager, 
problems caused by the manager’s time constraints, problems caused by the manager’s prior 
knowledge (or rather lack thereof), and problems due to the manager’s personality or attitude 
towards the expert. 
 
A prerequisite for effective knowledge transfer between expert and manager is the expert’s 
understanding of the manager’s situation (as outlined in the previous section). While this is in 
part the responsibility of the expert, he or she can not understand the manager’s context without 
the manager’s help. Very often, tough, managers do not inform experts well enough. They do not 
inform them about their knowledge needs (i.e., what they need to know, why they need to know 
it, and how and when the results should be presented), their prior knowledge, their restrictions or 
their preferences (this is partly due to the ASK problem discussed in table 2). Managers 
frequently forget to specify the focus and scope of a required analysis. They fail to clearly 
articulate their decision criteria and their weightings. In briefing the expert, managers make 
many of the mistakes that are typically associated with experts: they use management acronyms 
that the expert doesn’t understand (such as ROE, EVA, ROI, BSC, SWOT, DCF, etc.) they 
overload the expert with (at times irrelevant) details or they do not use their time well to give the 
expert a complete understanding of an assignment (e.g., delegating research or analysis tasks in 
an informal, ad-hoc style). During an assignment, they do not keep the experts informed of 
changing parameters in the environment or changing policies within the company. They do not 
provide much needed feedback on the experts’ progress and whether the achieved results go in 
the right direction. Managers may also exert counterproductive pressure on experts to produce 
results very quickly –   results that lead to clear alternatives or yes or no decisions, giving the 
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expert no possibility for differentiated recommendations  (see the cognitive bias on dichotomized 
reasoning in table 2).10 
 
A second problem cluster is caused by the manager’s lack of relevant, up-to-date domain 
knowledge. As the quote that introduced this section illustrates, obsolete technological (or legal 
for that matter) know-how of a manager can become an obstacle to efficient knowledge transfer, 
especially if a manager does not accept the fact that his or her knowledge is outdated. Managers 
without a technical (legal, marketing, etc.) background may also overestimate their level of 
understanding of an expert domain, or they may simply not give enough importance to such 
domain knowledge. Managers thus frequently avoid detailed topic discussions, and instead focus 
on related but more familiar issues, such as budget implications or internal politics. Another 
strategy of managers who fear to admit a lack of knowledge is to attack the expert in an area that 
they understand well. All of this can lead to implicit misunderstandings and to the wrong 
communication and application of expert advice by managers. There is also a danger that a 
manager mistakes an expert’s values and personal preferences for expertise or that he asks the 
wrong kinds of questions. 
 
Part of the ‘knowledge problem’ described in the last paragraph is related to the manager’s 
attitude and his or her willingness to admit ‘not to know it all’. The manager’s attitude and 
personality has further potentially negative effects on the knowledge communication with 
experts. The manager may have personal preferences which make him more or less open to 
suggestions from experts (see the cognitive confirmation bias in table 2). The preferences can 
relate to the domain that is discussed, but they can also relate to such arbitrary aspects as the 
format or sequence of the presented information. The manager’s attitude is also critical for the 
relationship between the expert and the decision maker. If the manager does not take the expert 
seriously or value his know-how, genuine knowledge transfer will become very difficult, as the 
expert senses the manager’s reservations and becomes de-motivated and cynical. This, of course, 
does not contribute to trust and relationship building, an important ingredient for sustainable 
collaboration between experts and managers (see the set-up-to-fail syndrome in table 2). An 
often heard problem in this context is the reluctance of many managers to listen to internal 
experts. This ‘prophet’ problem refers to the fact that many managers rather hire outside 
consultants as neutral experts than listen to the experts in their own company who may have 
more intimate knowledge of an issue (this is related to the Cassandra syndrome in table 2). 
                                                 
10  In his insightful book on information anxiety (Wurman, 2000, pp. 61-75) Richard Saul Wurman provides a list 
of managerial behavior archetypes related to giving and receiving instructions from collaborators. These 
(caricature-like) types can be applied to the manager-expert interaction, especially in the briefing stage. An 
example of such an instruction-giving archetype is the ‘ping-ponger’ who asks for information that is focused, 
but broad, creative, but factual, or advanced, but comprehensible. An example of a poor instruction receiver is 
the ‘just give me the details’ manager who always tries to second-guess the expert and does not really listen to 
what he or she has to say. 
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One of the most frequently heard problems that experts voice when asked about management’s 
mistakes in knowledge communication relates to the adequate allocation and use of time for 
knowledge transfer. It seems that many managers dramatically underestimate the time required 
to gain a common understanding of an issue with experts. This at least, is what many experts 
have told us in several focus groups. In their opinion, the increased pressure to make decisions 
fast reduces the time allocated for communication and deliberation and this in turn dramatically 
lowers the quality of knowledge transfer and use. This is a problem, however, that seems 
difficult to resolve, as managers face many other tasks besides interacting with experts who help 
them to make decisions. But according to some experts that we have interviewed, the timing 
issue is not just about quantity, it  is also about timing or rather time planning. Timing refers to 
correctly planning and sequencing periods of knowledge transfer. Many times, experts need to 
intervene on a moment’s notice, so that thorough preparation is no longer possible. This can lead 
to faulty analyses or decision making that is based on preliminary results only. 
 
Summarizing the knowledge transfer problems caused by managers, we can conclude that the 
difficulties already begin in the briefing stage, when managers articulate their knowledge needs. 
At a later stage of the collaboration, it is often management’s lack of knowledge or interest in the 
expert domain that leads to problems (this is similar to the Cassandra syndrome described in 
table 2). This is aggravated by a management attitude or personality that does not value the 
experts’ input or is afraid to admit ignorance.  Adequate timing by the manager, finally, is a 
major challenge in the entire expert manager interaction process. The problems discussed so far 
can be clearly attributed to either experts or managers. This is not true for the problems that are 
described in the next section. 
 
3.5 Knowledge communication problems caused by mismatched assumptions and actions 
 
Managers and us just seem to have different priorities and sensibilities. We [engineers] look for 
quality and reliability, whereas they focus on time and money. 
       IT-specialist at a multinational financial services group 
 
In this section, we discuss problems that arise out of the reciprocal behavior or lacking co-
orientation (e.g., alignment of thoughts and actions, see McLeod & Chaffee, 1973) of experts 
and managers. While some similar problems have already been discussed in the previous two 
sections, this section stresses the fact that many knowledge transfer problems exist because the 
managers’ and the experts’ assumptions or actions are not explicitly aligned.    
  
It seems that misunderstandings among experts and manages are often due to unarticulated, 
implicit, but conflicting assumptions. These assumptions relate to a variety of issues that are 
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relevant for the transfer of knowledge, such as the nature and importance of the problem that is 
discussed, the procedure and timing employed to discuss it, the understanding of the other’s role 
(incl. strengths and weaknesses), expectations regarding the outcome, the existence of a 
consensus11, or even assumptions regarding the objective of the communication itself. Still other 
implicit, but frequently diverging assumptions of managers and experts relate to the specific 
meanings of terms, categories12, symbols or metaphors. Examples of misunderstandings of terms 
abound. We have encountered two particularly surprising ones in a diagnostics and in a 
consulting company: In the first case, the experts’ understanding of ‘customer focus’ related to 
product durability and reliability, while the managers associated the term with service excellence 
and speedy complaints handling. Earlier in the same team, managers and engineers were unsure 
whether they were each talking about internal or external (or both) customers.  In the second 
case, the misunderstood term was ‘order management’. While the experts correctly interpreted 
the term as the process by which orders are captured, processed, and delivered, management 
thought the concept related to a pending outsourcing decision. This misunderstanding was 
discovered when the two groups categorized the same process differently, one as a core process, 
the other as a support process. Misunderstandings like these do not only relate to terms. They can 
also relate to the diverging or ambiguous use of simple symbols like arrows, as the following 
quote of an IT engineer illustrates: “[When explaining a concept to management] one easily 
takes a pen and starts to draw something on the whiteboard or on paper: boxes, circles, arrows 
and behind each symbol, there is a specific semantic [meaning]. The trouble is that this semantic 
is not standardized and so an arrow can have very different meanings.” If these assumptions on 
symbol meanings are not made explicit, misunderstandings abound.  
 
Another form of particularly harmful implicit assumptions are stereotypes. These can lead to 
biases in the communication process, for example when managers are viewed as purely political 
opportunists or experts as people who always overestimate the importance of their field. When 
these implicit assumptions collide because they have never been made exposed, discussed, and 
corrected, misunderstandings ensue. 
 
Besides mismatched assumptions, knowledge communication frequently suffers from 
mismatched actions (as a result of a lack of common ground, see table 2). Such mismatched 
‘communicative’ actions can relate to simple issues as documenting the outcomes of an 
interaction consistently (to avoid the knowing-doing gap discussed in table 2) or to more 
sophisticated actions, such as changing the level of abstraction at which an issue is discussed: 
While a manager may still be talking about the general problem context, the expert may already 
                                                 
11  While a manager may think that an issue has been clarified by declaring it as less relevant, the expert may still 
disagree, but not voice his or her objections (see the groupthink and false consensus effect in table 2). 
12  It is an established finding of cognitive science that experts and novices in a particular domain, categorize issues 
quite differently (see for example Browne & Ramesh 2002). 
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react by describing a particular aspect of a sub-problem. This can lead to further 
misunderstandings or lost time. Valuable time can also be lost when the two sides do not agree 
on a common time schedule for their interaction. While the experts may act on the assumption 
that they have a full hour for the problem analysis, managers may want to move from analysis to 
preparing the decision after only twenty minutes of discussion. Time problems such as this one 
are partly due to the situation in which managers and experts interact (e.g., tightly scheduled 
meetings or workshops). Thus, the interaction situation itself can cause communication 
problems. These situational problems are examined in the next section.   
 
3.6 Knowledge communication problems caused by the interaction situation 
 
As an analyst and energy expert it’s tough for me to inform managers or investors about a 
promising technology when they have just heard five such optimistic stories in the preceding 
expert presentations. 
Financial analyst of an investment firm 
 
Whereas the previous sections have focused on knowledge communication barriers that exist 
because of the people communicating, this section lists some of the situational factors that make 
knowledge transfer difficult. A communication situation can be characterized in terms of its time 
(of the day), duration, location (or medium), and immediate surrounding (e.g., noise or 
interruptions that cause distractions). These factors can have significant negative effects on the 
knowledge transfer quality of managers and experts. The time of the day of the interaction, for 
example, can affect the performance of both managers and experts negatively if their meeting is 
scheduled at a sub-optimal moment. Sub-optimal moments can be directly after lunch, late in the 
afternoon, or just before other important meetings. The timing of a manager-expert interaction is 
also crucial because of halo-, anchoring-, or priming-effects (see the section on cognitive biases 
in table 2): If an expert makes his contribution to a group of managers who have just listened to 
an opposing view, the expert will have a more difficult time explaining his own point of view. In 
this sense, the success of an expert-manager interaction may be path-dependent, meaning that 
events shortly before the interaction (such as a negative experience of one of the managers) can 
influence its outcome. Problems may also arise because of the duration of an interaction, as the 
attention and concentration of meeting participants tends to decrease after a certain period of 
time. Another factor that is normally beyond the influence of the expert is the location of the 
interaction. If there is continuous distraction, noise, or an inadequate infrastructure, the expert’s 
task of conveying what he or she knows can become difficult. This can be particularly true if the 
expert presents his findings over the phone or via video-conferencing, as he cannot be sure of the 
undivided attention of the managers participating in the meeting. Choosing the right time, 
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duration, medium or location is thus a crucial task that has be achieved before the actual 
communication begins. 
 
The communication problems discussed so far are not only caused by the immediate meeting or 
communication situation, but also by the overall organizational context in which the interaction 
takes place. Such organizational reasons for strenuous knowledge communication are examined 
in the last problem group. 
 
3.7 Knowledge communication problems caused by the organizational context  
 
As specialists, we find it frustrating that we’re not informed when priorities or responsibilities 
change. Whether that’s due to internal politics or external market changes, we need to be in-
formed if the overall context of our assignment or even the people commissioning our work 
change. 
IT specialist at a multinational  bank. 
  
The organizational context in which management-expert interactions take place can affect the 
quality of knowledge communication and thus the quality of the collaborative decision making. 
The organizational parameters of an expert manager interaction can in this sense ‘overshadow’ 
an entire problem-focused conversation among experts and managers and make it unproductive. 
In our interviews and focus groups with experts and managers three such organizational factors 
came up repeatedly: first, conflicting interests of specialists and experts based on their 
organizational situation,  second, frequent changes in interaction partners because of re-
organizations, and third, pressure from other groups in the organization on the two parties 
involved in knowledge communication. 
 
If the interests of experts and managers who need to collaborate on a complex issue are not 
aligned, their communication style and knowledge transfer will inevitably be affected. Both 
managers and specialists will be less open, less motivated and more strategic in their sharing and 
acceptance of insights. Reasons for such diverging interests can be manifold. They may be due to 
alternative views on funding needs: While engineers or in-house scientists may stress the need 
for research, managers may stress the capital requirements of marketing. Thus, their two 
(financial) interests are opposed, as each priority is associated with funding requests for the 
respective peer group.13 Other diverging interests may relate to different sensibilities or 
priorities: Where managers may be keen on reducing costs and increasing speed, engineers may 
focus on quality and security (the NASA challenger case illustrates these at times diverging 
                                                 
13  In one case we encountered, a group of managers asked the specialists in an engineering department to share all 
their techniques and methods with them so that they could evaluate the transfer of the department to another 
country. Needless to say that the engineers were not as forthcoming as the managers had anticipated. 
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interests, see Vaughn, 1996). Another area of potential conflicts of interest among specialists and 
managers is planning: While managers may want to keep their options open and explore various 
routes simultaneously without clear decisions, experts need clear guidelines and committed 
resources. The conflict thus centres around long-term considerations (pursued by some experts) 
versus short-term orientation (sometimes pursued by managers). These problems of interest are 
often aggravated by the fact that the differing interests cannot be discussed openly, thus leading 
to misunderstandings and a lack of mutual trust (which is a key prerequisite for functioning 
knowledge transfer, see Szulanski, 1999). 
 
A second organizational factor that can make knowledge transfer difficult are reorganizations, 
particularly reorganizations that lead to new responsibilities, new priorities, or new teams and 
thus new expert-manager constellations (see also the quote that introduced this section). While 
this may be beneficial in some cases (i.e., enabling a fresh start without a prior history of 
negative experiences), it usually involves various adjustment processes and ‘lost’ time in the 
communication, e.g., time to get to know the other person and his or her preferences, values, and 
assumptions. One expert (an analyst) we interviewed called this phase “expert calibration”. The 
problem of changing contexts is particularly frustrating for experts when they feel that they have 
not been kept  ‘in the loop’, that is to say that they have not been informed by management about 
re-aligned priorities, new responsibilities, or new evidence. Because of this lack of top-down 
information, experts may have worked in a (later) irrelevant area. 
 
A third and closely related reason for sub-optimal knowledge communication is outside 
pressure. As shown by Janis in his studies on groupthink (Janis, 1982), outside pressure can 
negatively affect the decision quality of a team. Under pressure from other parts of the 
organization, managers may allocate less time for expert consultation. The experts, in turn, may 
feel obliged to ‘tune’ their input towards the expected results (see the audience tuning effect 
listed as a communication bias in table 1). Outside pressure may also lead to a more hectic 
discussion and less objective deliberation in a team of experts and managers. 
 
While these organizational factors cannot be directly influenced by the managers and experts 
who collaborate in a knowledge-intensive decision process, they can be aware of them and make 
them an explicit area of concern and discussion. This can help to pro-actively avoid effects such 
as mistrust, missing alignment, or groupthink. 
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3.8 The resulting model of knowledge communication quality 
 
The previous sections on knowledge communication problems can now be summarized as a 
model that lists the problems and their impact on the drivers of knowledge communication 
quality, as well as the immediate and ultimate goals of knowledge communication. The model is 
depicted in the following diagram. 
 
Figure 1: The structural model of knowledge communication problems 
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ve illustrates that there are five main drivers for high qua
communication among experts and managers. These five areas relate to the major causes of 
knowledge transfer problems, namely the expert, the manager, their interaction patterns, their 
communication situation, and their organizational context.14 The model further stipulates that a 
high quality of knowledge communication will ultimately lead to better decisions and greater 
corporate success. There is no single activity that can remove the problems at the left of this 
model. Rather a set of actions need to be taken to assure that the five qualities can be improved.   
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14  It goes without saying that the extent of knowledge communication problems also depends on the complexity of 
the knowledge that needs to be conveyed and applied to a decision making context.  
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have introduced a communication perspective on the topic of knowledge 
transfer, particularly between domain experts and decision makers in management. We have 
shown in which management situations such knowledge transfer is important and how it can be 
characterized. We have described the differences among the communication of information and 
the communication of knowledge, outlining the demands on what is communicated (insights, 
experiences, know-how) and how one communicates (interactively, collaboratively, iteratively). 
The main contribution of this paper is a classification of knowledge communication problems 
among experts and managers based on the main cause of such problems, i.e., whether the 
interaction problems arise because of the expert’s behavior, because of the manager, because of 
mutual (incompatible) attitudes or actions, because of the interaction setting, or problems due to 
organizational factors. The problems listed in these categories have been mentioned by 
specialists, such as engineers or analysts, or by managers, typically representatives of middle to 
upper management. However, our approach has been qualitative and it is based on a limited 
sample size in two cultural settings (Switzerland and Germany). Hence the generalizability of 
our problem taxonomy is still limited and needs to be further developed (for example through 
survey studies that question a greater number of both experts and managers). Nevertheless, this 
preliminary problem jostle has important implications for managers who wish to fully profit 
from the input of their experts. They need to develop the communication skills of their experts in 
order to avoid the problems listed as expert-caused. But they also need to be aware of their own 
shortcomings in such knowledge transfer situations. They need  to make  mutual assumptions, 
stereotypes and preferences explicit and find a common approach to knowledge transfer 
meetings. It is often their responsibility to find an optimal setting for transfer situations, so that 
the decision making process is not affected by sub-optimal parameters, be it on the interaction 
level or on the organizational level. 
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Appendix: Information on the Focus Groups and Interviews 
 
The following table lists the focus group details. The focus groups were all conducted prior to 
(in-house and public) seminars on professional communication. Participants were asked one 
main questions by the facilitator: what do they, in their experience, see as the major problems in 
the communication between managers and experts (and can they give specific examples or 
anecdotes of each problem). Based on this question, the facilitator lead an approximately half 
hour long discussion among the experts and collected the various problems that were mentioned.  
 
Group Number Duration Number of 
Participants 
Date 
Focus Group 1 40 minutes 17 (mostly telecom 
engineers) 
6.12.02  
Focus Goup 2 40 minutes 19 (mostly IT 
specialists) 
23.1.03  
Focus Goup 3 30 minutes 20 (mostly engineeers) 24.3.03  
Focus Goup 4 40 minutes 18 (mostly IT experts) 25.4.03   
Focus Goup 5 40 minutes 13 (mostly automotive 
engineers) 
24.5.03 
Focus Goup 7 30 minutes 8 (marketing analysts) 5.6.03 
Focus Goup 6 40 minutes 16 (mostly telecom 
and IT experts) 
1.9.03  
 
As far as the interviews are concerned, they were conducted with employees from two 
companies. In the first company, a multinational insurance company, we interviewed 20 IT 
managers and specialists in February 2004. In the second company, a small-sized consulting 
firm, we interviewed 10 (female and male) technology consultants (all engineers) in March 2004.   
 
